ACTION ALERT:
Please write to U.S. and Canadian Authorities
Proposed Import and transport of Liquid Radioactive
Wastes
Bearing Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to the U.S.
from Canada
Here
are some historical background notes related to this topic.
1.
AECL's use of HEU (weapons-grade uranium)
For
many years, AECL has been using HEU as a "target material" to produce
radioisotopes, specifically molybdenum-99
(Mo-99) -- which is the source material for the technetium-99m (Tc-99m) used in hospitals around the world for diagnostic
procedures including bone scans. Millions of such diagnostic
usages are made every year.
See
http://www.ccnr.org/isotope_shortage.html .
The HEU
target is inserted into specially engineered channels in the NRU reactor so
that it can be exposed to neutrons from the core and
withdrawn at will. During its exposure to neutrons,
many of the U-235 atoms in the target fission and produce the usual
spectrum of fission products -- dozens
of them -- the same intensely radioactive byproducts that constitute the bulk of the high-level radioactive waste from
nuclear reactors.
The
irradiated targets are then chemically processed to remove one of those fission products, Mo-99. This requires dissolving the target in acid,
yielding a highly radio- active liquid waste containing
the other fission products (except the radioactive fission gases which escape) and the residual (unfissioned) HEU.
It is
this highly radioactive liquid waste containing HEU that would be shipped to
the Savannah River Site (SRS). The intense
radioactivity is due to the fission products, but the
real security problem is with the residual HEU.
2.
The Security Problem with HEU
HEU is
immediately usable as a nuclear explosive material in a rather simple
"gun-type" atomic bomb, similar to the
Hiroshima bomb, once it has been converted into a solid form. The gun-type design is so simple that it is
"foolproof" -- testing is unnecessary. In fact
the US never tested the gun-type atomic bomb before using it to destroy the
city of Hiroshima on August 6 1945.
Given
this fact, together with the fact that HEU can be handled (and smuggled)
without elaborate radiation shielding,
it is clear that any trafficking in HEU poses very serious security risks -- if this material falls into the hands of
criminals, terrorists or governments
desiring to acquire
a nuclear weapons capability. Even sub-critical quantities are a matter of concern since several such quantities can be combined to make a
super-critical mass (needed for an atomic
explosion).
For
many years now, the US Government has been trying to put an end to all civilian
use of HEU in order to address these security
concerns. Research reactor that previously used HEU as
a fuel (including the NRU reactor at Chalk River) have had to convert to using
LEU (low-enriched uranium) as fuel instead.
LEU is
uranium that has been enriched to less than 20%
uranium-235, so that over 80% of the mass is non-fissile, non-explosive
uranium-238. Conventional wisdom is that LEU
cannot be used to make an atomic bomb but HEU can be used
for nuclear weapons purposes. Weapons-grade uranium is HEU with an
enrichment of more than 90% U-235, and
in fact the uranium targets used at Chalk River are (I think) 93.3% U-235. See http://ccnr.org/maple_heu.html .
Although
it had to reconfigure the NRU reactor to use LEU fuel, AECL has refused to quit using HEU as "targets" for isotope production. In
principle, LEU targets could be used but
AECL says it would
add greatly to the cost of production.
This
argument overlooks the fact that isotope production is
already a non-profitable business, highly subsidized by Canadian taxpayers. Even though the private company Nordion makes
profits on sales of its so-called "molybdenum cows"
which are used by hospitals as "technetium generators", they can only do so because they get their molybdenum-99 from AECL which loses
money constantly on this on-going operation.
Switching to LEU targets would either mean charging more for the technetium generators or increasing the subsidization of Mo-99
production at Chalk River.
Meanwhile,
other techniques for producing Mo-99 on a commercial basis using accelerators rather than reactors have been (and are being) developed in Canada
and elsewhere. None of these require HEU and
some of them don't even require uranium at all.
3.
Shipments of HEU from Chalk River to Savannah River
For
many years -- especially when AECL was using HEU fuel in the NRU reactor --
there were regular shipments of irradiated
HEU from Chalk River to Savannah River (SRS). However SRS is a military installation, and Canada has a 1955 bilateral
agreement with USA not to use any
nuclear materials
from Canada for nuclear explosive purposes. Prior to 1955, a lot of
plutonium produced at Chalk River was sold
to the USA for use in their nuclear weapons program:
"The majority of the plutonium received from Canada came
from the Chalk River Facility.
Approximately, 252
kilograms of plutonium in spent reactor fuel was sent to the
Savannah River Site where it was processed and blended with other materials in the
main production streams for
the United States nuclear weapons program. "
[citation
from a US DOE letter dated March 4, 1996, addressed to Robert Del Tredici -- see http://www.ccnr.org/DOE.html ]
But
shipments of irradiated HEU continued to be made from Chalk River to Savannah
River for decades after the 1955
bilateral agreement was signed. The shipments were being sent over the Ivy Lea Bridge (in the 1000 Islands area of the St.Lawrence
River). An NGO group in New York State protested
against these shipments and succeeded in forcing the Thousand Island Bridge Authority to pass a regulation forbidding the
transport of radioactive waste across
the bridge unless
there was a $500 million bond posted. At that point AECL started shipping the irradiated fuel through Montreal to the Eastern Townships
Autoroute and then through Vermont. In Vermont,
communities responded by passing mutually inconsistent bylaws as to which routes these shipments had to take and at which times they
had to be made -- such a complicated patchwork of
bylaws that it was virtually impossible to continue the shipments.
During
this whole period of time, I personally investigated this situation from
the point of view of non-proliferation agreements,
knowing that Savannah River was a military establishment -- and discovered that the irradiated fuel was being used in
the US nuclear weapons program. The HEU
recovered from the irradiated shipments was being added to other HEU to make the "driver rods" used in the SRS military
reactors, dedicated to producing weapon-grade plutonium to be used in the US nuclear arsenal. (These
so-called "plutonium production reactors" use HEU "driver rods" and depleted uranium "target
rods". The neutrons produced by the U-235 atoms fissioning in the driver rods, irradiated the U-238 in the DU
"target rods", transforming
the U-238 atoms
into Plutonium-239 atoms. Voilˆ!)
CCNR
put out press releases and background papers on this situation, and the press
picked up the story. At first
AECL officials told reporters that the HEU had been obtained from the USA and was in fact still US property, that AECL only
"leased" the material and was obliged to return the irradiated material to the USA for recovery of the residual HEU
-- because it was their property in the first place.
I told the reporters to ask AECL officials to read them the wording of the contract which required AECL to return the HEU; whereupon
AECL was forced to admit that the explanation
previously given was wrong. HEU was in fact purchased from the USA, and had become AECL property -- and there was no obligation to
return the material to the USA. The only reason the
shipments were being made was because AECL obtained a "cash credit" that could be used against future purchases of HEU (to
help defray the cost).
This
was a shocking breach of Canada's obligations under the non-proliferation
bilateral agreement with the US, and I
revealed this breach personally -- and quite dramatically -- at an Ottawa meeting hosted by Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament
Doug Roche, when I declared that Canada was
sending nuclear materials from Chalk River to Savannah River that was ending up in the nuclear weapons program. The
Ambassador turned to the AECL people who were there and said,
"Is this true?" And they just went red in the face. The shipments were stopped and were not resumed as far as I know.
But then President Obama held an important summit meeting
in Washington DC in April 2010 to rein in the use of HEU:
See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/12/obama-nuclear-summit-worl_n_533731.html